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Summary  finidings
In reform.nig  the  finanicial sector  in transition  economies,  the banking  reform  approach  taken,  weak  banks  have
one important  debale  is abouLt  whether  governments  moved  very little  beyond  central  planning.
should  trv to reform  existing  state-owned  banks  - the  Regression  estimates  suggest  that  in transition
rehabilitation  approach  --  or whether  a new private  economies  three  things  are associated  with  slow  progress
banking  system  should  be allowed  to emerge  - a new  of weak banks:  overconcentration,  preferential  treatmenit
ent7'  approach.  Or  should  therLe be a mix of the  two  by governments,  and  limited  entry  for new  banks.  The
approachcs,  in wvhich the activities  of state  banks are  direction  of causality  is often  unclear.  Policies  and
restricted  wThile  a parallel  private  banking  system  structural  conditions  can  affect  bliank  quality,  but
develI  ps:  whleniever a banking  system  has a certain  quality,
Claessens'  s  cross-countrv  comparison  of banks'  particular  policies  may  also arise  or structures  exist.
inst!tutional  developiment  in 25 transition  cconomies  The  role of banks  will remain  limited  in many
suggests  that  progress  can  be faster  under  the  new entry  transition  economies  because  of weak  legal
approach,  especially  re!ative  to initial  coniditions.  infrastructures,  much  uncertainty  and  inside  information,
Progress  unider the rehabilitation  approach  appears  to be  and problems  associated  with  highly  leveraged  financial
inhibited  bhy  poor  incentives.  intermediaries  - including  fraud,  political  interference,
In most  countries,  even  those  with  a good  banking  and  implicit  guarantees.  In the short  run,  self-finance  and
infrasrructure  and  a large  segment  uf good  banks,  a two-  intermediation  among  enterprises  and  throUgh  nonbank
Track process  li  ei  volved,  i  ith  large and grow;ing  financial  institutions  may  prevail.
difterenices  betwsee  n weak aiid  strong  banks.  W\hatever
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Summary
Two different  approaches  to banking  reform in transition countries  can be distinguished:
new entry and rehabilitation.  The new entry approach entails the spontaneous breakup and
privatization  of existing  state banks,  the entry of many new banks, and in some  cases  the
liquidation  of old banks. It is illustrated  by Estonia and Russia. Many countries  in the NIS have
chosen this approach. The rehabilitation  approach emphasizes  the recapitalization  of existing
state banks together  with extensive  programs  to develop them institutionally  and  eventually  to
privatize  them. Breakups  and  new  entry  are relatively  limited. This approach  is exemplified  by
Hungary  and particularly  Poland  in recent  years. Many countries  in the CEE  have  chosen  this
approach. In practice,  influenced  by initial  conditions and early developments,  countries
(including  the examples  mentioned)  have  included  aspects of both approaches  or have  yet to
choose a consistent  financial  approach  strategy.
Much of the debate  about  financial  sector reform in transition  economies  involves  the
weights  to be placed  on the various  aspects  of the new entry  or rehabilitation  approach. It is not
easy to tell what balance  is best suited  for a particular economy. Reform  approaches  and their
success  depend on initial  conditions  (such  as institutional  legacy  and the depth  of the financial
system)  and progress  in other,  complementary  reforms (such as enterprise  and legal  reform).
Whether a particular  approach  is succeeding  is also difficult  to say: different  initial  conditions,
external  shocks,  the complex  relationships  between banking and other reforms,  and the short time
period which  has passed  make  the impact  of financial  reform on transition  economies  hard to
measure. The institutional  development  of banks, a prerequisite  for developing  a good financial
system,  is currently  then also  the most meaningful  indicator to assess  progress  in banking  reform.
Since  the variety in approaches  has led to large differences  in institutional  capacity,  both within
and among  transition  economies  as well  as relative to other countries  at similar  income  levels,
there are some useful  lessons  on banking  reform  for transition economies  and  potentially  also for
other economies.
To obtain  a cross-country  comparison  of the degree of institutional  development  of banks,
a questionnaire  was conducted  among  financial  sector specialists  and central  staff  in the World
Bank. It covered twenty-five  transition  countries  with a wide variety  of banking  approach
approaches  and six comparator  countries. The survey distinguished  segments  of better and
weaker banks within  each country. The following  key patterns, suggesting  lessons,  emerged:
*  Progress in institutional  development  can be faster under new entry  than  under  rehabililation.
The better segments  of some  countries  pursuing the new entry approach  (for example,
Estonia,  Russia) are now at par  with some  countries pursuing  the rehabilitation  approach  and
with countries  at similar  income  levels,  even though their starting conditions  were worse. This
suggest that choosing  the rehabilitation  approach strategy when faced  with a weak
institutional  legacy  can be a poor  policy  as progress is slow.ii
*  A two-track process has also evolved in many countries with large and growing differences
between strong and weak banks.  The weak banks of almost all countries have not evolved
much compared to central planning, even in transition economies with relatively good banking
supervision and infrastructure. Many weak banks often only survive because of preferential
treatment from the government or through attracting  household deposits by offering above-
market interest rates.  As a result, fair competition for better new, private banks is limited.
Across countries, the institutional quality of banks also relates to certain policy measures
and structural variables.
*  A more liberal  entry policy for domestic banks is associated with better strong banks, but also
worse weak banks. The higher the number of banks, the higher the quality of the best
segment, but also the lower the quality of the worst segment (new entry through banks started
by state enterprises is particularly associated with weaker banks).  Furthermore, the share of
banking assets held by the top five banks has a negative relationship with overall bank quality.
These relationships likely  reflect the effects of innovation and increased  competitive forces-
positive for the better banks and negative for the weaker banks-and  a widening distribution
of banks when entry is more liberal. They also suggest that oligopolistic  structures inhibit
progress of the financial  system in transition economnies,  particularly when maintained by state-
ownership (the number of state-owned banks has a negative relationship  with the quality of
best as well as worst banks).
3  Better troubled bank intervention and formal recapitalization programs are positively related
to bank quality. The quality of banking infrastructure (especially interbank  market) has also a
positive association with the quality of the banking system.
3  The higher the share of currency in broad money, the lower the quality of banks. This
suggests that households act rationally: they will keep their money in cash if the banking
system is poor.  The higher  the share of the private sector in GDP, the better the quality of
banks, suggesting that enterprise reform is a complement to banking  reform (and vice-versa).
*  Initial conditions are still reflected in the current quality of banks.  Both new entry and
rehabilitation approach countries with less distorted initial conditions and a higher level of
development have better quality banks.  But approaches  do matter as there are many
outliers-both  better and worse-relative  to initial conditions.  In particular, there are many
worse outliers among the weak banks, again suggesting that many weak banks continue to
receive preferential support.
Some of these patterns reflect not only causal relationships, as policies and structural
conditions matter, but also reverse relationships, as particular policies more likely arise or
structures more likely exist whenever the banking system has a certain quality. Policy
recommendations thus do not easily follow.BANKING REFORM  IN TRANSITION-COUNTRIES
Of the many debates about financial approach in transition economies, an important one is
whether governments should try to reform (rehabilitate) the existing state-owned commercial
banks or whether a completely new or parallel banking system should be allowed to emerge.
While much has been written about this,'  in the end it is an empirical question: which approach
leads the quickest to a good financial system for a given country.  Since there has been a wide
variety of banking reform approaches across countries, and given that the starting positions and
many other policies of transition economies were relatively similar 2 while banking reform policies
have differed greatly, one should be able to draw some lessons from comparing progress in
building a financial  system, lessons which may not only be useful for transition economies, but
also for other countries. The paper tries to make this comparison by using the results of a survey
of World Bank staff on the quality of banks and banking in transition economies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section I start out with describing-in
a stylized fashion-the  two approaches transition economies have taken to banking reform, new
entry and rehabilitation. I also relate these approaches to initial conditions and progress in other
areas of reform, particularly  macroeconomic stabilization and enterprise and legal reform, as these
have influenced both banking reform approaches as well as outcomes. In the second section, I
argue that it is difficult  to measure the progress in banking reform with the measures
conventionally used for developing and developed countries, such as the impact on economic
growth, investment,  the efficiency  of the financial system, etc.  Basically, large shocks, the
complex relationships  between banking and other reforms, and the short time period which has
passed make the impact of financial reform on the economy and the banking sector itself hard to
measure.  I argue therefore that the institutional development of banks, a prerequisite for
developing a good financial  system, is currently the most meaningful  indicator to assess progress
in banking reform in transition economies.  To measure institutional progress, I rely on a survey of
World Bank staff who were asked to compare the capacity of banking systems across transition
economies and other countries. The section provides the results from this survey, distinguishing
stronger and weaker parts of the banking system in each country. It also provides measures of the
quality of the banking environment,  including banking regulation and supervision.
' General  references  on  financial  approach  in transition  economies  are Saunders  and  Walter  1991.  Bonin  and
Szekely 1994,  Caprio,  Folkerts-Landau  and Lane 1994,  Dittus 1994a  and 1994b,  Pohl  and Claessens  1994,  Caprio
1995,  Borish, Long  and Noel 1995,  and Bonin and Mizsei, 1995.
2 Relative  to the greater  variety  one  observes  in the rest of the world. The transition  economies  have  very  similar
legacies in their financial  system  which  are well discussed  in McKinnon  1991  and Kornai 1992.  All started with
a mono-bank,  which  uas split  at different  points in time into a two-tier  system  with  a central  bank and a number of
commercial  banks,  often  specialized  by sector. Banks initially acted as accounting  agencies,  keeping  track of the
financial  transactions  that resulted  from  planned allocations. Banks were  also the passive  recipients  of household
savings,  which were often  the only  asset households  could hold. Normal  banking skills,  including  risk
management,  project  screening  and  selection,  and a diversified  menu  of instruments  to attract  savers,  were not
present.  The other components of a financial system, including  the payments system, were rudimentary.
Nevertheless, there are some differences in legacies and in the last section I trv to correct for the currcnt quality of
financial  systems for those differences.2
The third section relates indicators for the quality of banks to banking reform approaches
and derives some general lessons. It argues that the speed of institutional progress has been faster
when entry into banking was rapid.  The section also relates the progress across countries to
specific government policies in an effort to identify which policies matter most and in what way.
Four individual  factors appear to have a positive relationship with the quality of both the stronger
and weaker banks in each country: the quality of troubled bank intervention (in large banks), the
intensity of bank recapitalizations,  the attitude towards entry of new (domestic) banks, and the
activity of the interbank market.  There is a negative relationship between the degree of new
banks established by state enterprises and the quality of banks.  The fourth section relates the
progress in establishing  good banks to structural factors and initial conditions.  It finds that the
higher the share of currency in broad money, the lower the quality of banks, and the higher the
share of the private sector in GDP, the better the quality of banks.  Countries with less distorted
initial conditions and a higher level of development also have better quality banks.  The fifth
section provides some conclusions.
1.  Introduction
Banking reform approaches
Two very different approaches to banking reform, new entry and rehabilitation, can be
distinguished. In practice, influenced by initial conditions and early developments, countries have
included aspects of both approaches or have yet to choose a consistent financial reform strategy.
The distinction is to some extent regional: many Newly Independent States (NIS) have followed
mostly the new entry approach towards banking reform, while most transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Asian transition economies (China and Vietnam) have
tended to follow mostly the rehabilitation approach.  The newv  entry approach has entailed the
spontaneous break-up and privatization of state banks, a (de-facto) policy of liberal entry of new
banks, and sometimes the liquidation of old banks.  The approach is best illustrated by Russia and
Estonia where it resulted in a rapid expansion in the number of banks, in Russia from 5 in 1989 to
2,500 in 1995. The new entry approach has not always been a deliberate policy choice.  In
Russia, for example, the confusion surrounding the breakup of the Union created an environment
where entry was basically  very liberal, as there was little central control  (it was almost free as
only rninimal  legal requirements needed to be satisfied and minimal capital requirements were at
times less than $10,000).  Enterprises established new banks and, as old state banks were broken
up, local governments and enterprises captured parts.  As a result, many new banks emerged. The
rehabilitation approach has included recapitalization and institutional development of existing
state banks, some limited  breakups of banks, limited privatization, and more limited entry.
Typical rehabilitation approach countries are Hungary and particularly Poland in the last few
years.  The current debate about further financial sector approach in many transition economies,
particularly the NIS and the Asian transition economies, involves choices between (aspects of)
these two approaches. 3
3 The banking  reforms  in the particular  countries  mentioned do not conform  exactly  to all mentioned  aspects  of a
certain approach. In Estonia,  for  example,  government  support  was provided  to some  banks. And in Poland, entry
early on was quite liberal. Nevertheless,  it provides  a rough classification  of reform  approaches. Gorton  and3
Relationships between banking reform and other reforms
The banking reform approaches are related to initial conditions and macro-economic
developments and other reforms since the start of transition. Reform approaches have been
influenced  the most by institutional legacy and macroeconomic developments.  Legal and
enterprise reform have played an important role in deterrnining the progress in banking reform. 4
The institutional legacy at the start of the transition: rehabilitation reformers have most
often better and new entry reformers worse legacies. Many CEE countries started from a much
stronger institutional base than other transition economies.  This was for a number of reasons:
some CEE countries had initiated earlier banking reforms-Hungary,  for example, split its mono-
bank already in mid-1980s, and many had already started complementary reforms (i.e., legal and
enterprise reforms); most CEE-countries could also draw from a pre-war legal framework, and in
general CEE-countries have closer linkages to market-economies, leading not only to some
transfers of know-how but also to competition in financial services from market-economies.
These initial conditions are still reflected in the quality of the financial systems in CEE, including
the number of bankers (Figure 1).5 In part because of these better starting positions, most of the
GEE countries chose for the rehabilitation reform strategy.  Countries in the NIS on the other
hand had worse starting conditions and many choose not to try build on what was there, but start
afresh and pursue the new entry approach.
Wilton  1996  provide  a conceptual  framework  and analyze  some  of the tradeoffs  involved  in banking  reform in
transition  economies,  particularly  the issue  of stability  (associated  with low  entiy and low  exit) versus  efficiency.
4 Annex  Table 1  provides  some  data on the banking systems  in transition economies  and some comparator
countries  which illustrates  the differences  in these  factors  across  countries. It provides  the depth of the financial
system  (broad  money  as a share of GDP,  M2/GDP),  data on the structure  of the banking system  (share  held by
biggest  five banks,  total number  of banks, and number  of state banks), information  on formal  bank
recapitalizations,  the relative  employment  in financial  services  (employment  per 100,000  of population),  and a
measure  of the confidence  in the financial  system  (currency  as a share of M2).
5 This  worse legacies  of the NIS compared  to CEE is also confirmed  in the proxies  of initial conditions  developed
by de Melo at al. (1996). See  further section  4.4
Figure 1: Employees in Banking
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Notes:  The numbers refer to employees in the real estate sector and the whole financial sector. not just banking:
data are for 1994 for NIS and for 1993 for other countries.  The Latin  American countries included are
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.
Macro-developments: Typical rehabilitation reformers are high financial-depth  countries
and new entry reformers are low financial-depth countries (Figure 2).  Macro-developments (i.e.,
inflation) determine the extent to which (bad) loans are wiped out through negative real interest
rates.  This influences the need to recapitalize banks, which in turn affects the choice of approach
strategy and the role for the government.  In general, in countries with low financial  depth, old
banks are more marginalized, economic as well as political, which makes governments less
interested in supporting the banking system, and the new entry approach is more likely. 6 There is
a reverse link between macro developments and banking reform as well: a greater extent of bad
loans-as  a consequence of an initially more distorted enterprise sector-results  in a more
difficult macro environment, which often means higher inflation and negative real interest rates.
Vice-versa, high financial-depth countries may have had relatively lower amounts of bad loans as
they had better initial conditions in the real economy-and  often also better complementary
policies, which made high inflation less likely and the rehabilitation  approach relatively more
attractive (as, for example, there will be less of an urgency to deal with a crisis). 7
Related to this has been the fiscal situation: in many NIS, fiscal revenues have dropped
dramatically since the onset of transition, while in CEE revenues have remained relatively high.
As a consequence, governments in the NIS had little choice but to ignore the problems of the
banking-and  banks were on "hard" budget, while in CEE larger fiscal revenues "afforded"
6 Exceptions to this pattern exist of course.  In Poland and Slovenia, for example, financial depth is relativelI low,
but bank approach has been more rehabilitation, and in Armenia,  Belarus and  Ukraine, financial depth is even
lower, but as financial sector approach has been little, old banks  still command  great power.
' Of course, many bad loans are "endogenous" with respect to bank and  enterprise  managers' behavior and neither
macro nor initial  conditions are the key causes.5
governments to recapitalize banks-and  banks could thus be on a "softer" budget.S  Low
financial depth and the limited  potential role of banks in transferring resources to enterprises, has
in turn also encouraged quasi-financial  intermediation among enterprises.  In many  transition
economies, interenterprise claims now exceed bank claims.  As enterprises often have a better
assessments of creditworthiness of other enterprises than banks in transition economies do, this
has some benefits.  As high inflation  wiped out their debts, enterprises also have become relatively
richer and are now financing  their investments out of own their resources.  Relative  to many
market economies, the roles of self-finance  and quasi-financial intermediation are thus more
important in many transition economies.
Figure 2: Financial Depth
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Notes:  End-of-1994  data; NIF  and  World  Bank  Staff  esumates.  corrected  for  the  effects  of high inflation  by
taking the average  of quarterly  M2/GDP ratios. Data are also reported  in Annex Table I.  The  Latin American
countries included  are Argentina,  Mexico  and Venezuela.
Legal and enterprise reform The pace of legal and enterprise reform has in particular
affected the evolution of the financial  system.  Banks rely on the legal system, including
procedures for collateral recovery and bankruptcy, to enforce their claims and perform their roles
as monitors of firms. Progress in these and other economic laws is needed for financial systems to
become more effective. In general, CEE countries have made more progress than NIS.
Enterprise  restructuring is needed to resolve the bad loan problem and to create new lending
opportunities.  Better firms create the demand for better banking services and so advance
institutional progress in the banking  sector. In the Baltics and the NIS many banks were
established or acquired by state enterprises.  The quality of governance of these banks depends on
whether their owners are privatized  and ownership is diversified. Substantial enterprise
8  This hardness  or softness  of  the  budget  constraint  is Xvis-a-vis the governments:  because  of the highly,  negative
interest  rate in many NIS, banking was extremely profitable.  with the costs born by depositors.6
privatization and the entry of new private firms is also a precondition for large-scale bank
privatization to produce meaningful  benefits. 9
2.  Progress in Banking Reform
Can one define and rank outcomes of reform approaches?
Financial reforrn approaches and outcomes are, however, not just determined by initial
conditions or complementary  reforms; policies matter too, if not just at the margin. Can one
therefore answer the question: which reform model leads the quickest to a "healthy" financial
sector for a country with certain initial conditions?  One form of analysis  would be to look at the
actual effects of the financial  system on the real economy, and then ask, for example, what type of
financial system is associated with higher economic growth.  This is a very difficult question to
answer, however, for a number of reasons.  First, it hard to characterize a financial system or a
reform model objectively. Second, even in stable developed countries it is difficult or impossible
to "rank" the different financial  systems that are in use now or in (recent) history in terms of their
impact on the economy." 0 For transition economies, this is even more difficult  as there has not
been sufficient time for the impact of financial reforms to become apparent, many "shocks"
(policy changes as well as real shocks) have occurred, uncertainty remains high, and there are
many linkages between the various reforms.
Another form of analysis  would be try to evaluate the functioning of the financial sector
alone, based on its input and outputs, and associated  efficiency indicators. For example, the level
of financial intermediation  (relative to GDP) and its changes over time, the amount of lending
(short and long-term, to private sector and state enterprises), intermediation  costs, and the
evolution of the relative employment  in the financial sector could be used as indicators of financial
sector development and performance. Again, these indicators are difficult  to use for transition
economies as their economic systems are still unstable.  In addition, numerous data and
methodological problems  arise, and at most some indicators of the level of financial depth can be
used on a systematic cross-country basis."
9  An alternative  distinction  sometimes  made  for banking reform approaches  is decentralized  (where  banks work
out their problem  loans)  versus  centralized  (where  loans are restructured  or forgiven  on the basis of general
principles and/or where  the state  takes  a larger role). To some extent this distinction  already  overlaps  with the
distinction  new entry versus  rehabilitation.  The NIS have centrally  "resolved"  much  of the bad loan problems
through hyper-inflation,  which  in part has allowed  the new entry approach. In CEE.  decentralized  approaches
have  been attemptecL  which  requires  bank recapitalization.  and the banking approach  has thus more  stressed
rehabilitation. The distinction  decentralized  versus decentralized does have  the advantage  that it highlights the
necessary  complementary  reforms  for the banking approach to work, particularly  enterprise  restructuring  for the
rehabilitation  approach. The speed  under the rehabilitation approach may  then also  more  reflect  the speed of
complementary  reforms  (e.g.,  privatization).
10 See, among others,  Allen  and Gale 1995,  Walter 1993. and Saunders  and Walter  1994.
l  Levine and Demirguc-Kunt  forthcoming,  for example, study in detail financial  sector  development  in developed
countries and more  advanced  developing  countries  (in relation to stock market  development).  As an empirical
measure  of the differences  in financial  development  betwveen  countries. they  use an index  which is a combination  of7
It is thus unavoidable  to use some other, intermediate objective.  Since the main weakness
of the financial  system in transition economies is the weak institutions and lack of human skills,
institutional development  should be a very useful key intermediate measure. The question of
evaluation reform approaches becomes then "which reform approach creates the quickest
progress in establishing  the institutions and human skill necessary for a good financial system
(which can perform its roles of resources mobilization, payment services, project screening and
asset allocation, corporate governance, etc.)."  Subquestions are "which specific government
policies contribute the most (or the least) to progress in establishing the institutions and human
skill necessary for a good financial system."  The step from having a good institutional
framework to a good financial system can, of course, not be taken for given as it will be
influenced by many  other factors, including the incentive framework for banking and the evolution
of complementary reforms. Countries with good bankers may still experience bad banking as the
incentives can be poor.  12
How to measure institutional development?
It is obviously  difficult  to evaluate institutional development in absolute terms.  For this
reason, a detailed questionnaire  was conducted of World Bank financial  sector specialists in the
regional and central departments which focused on cross-country comparisons. The questionnaire
asked interviewees  to score countries on a number of indicators of institutional development.  All
together,  58 indicators resulted, subdivided in three categories: quality of banking regulation,
supervision and intervention; infrastructure for banks (payment systems, accounting); and the
quality of banks themselves. For the banks, the respondents were asked to distinguish-where
appropriate according  to their judgment-better  from worse segments of the banking system in
each country. As the choice was left to the respondent, the categories better and worse are thus
not absolute, but rather indicate whether it was deemed useful to distinguish  these two categories
given the quality distribution of all banks in the country.1  The difference  between the two classes
was most often described  as state versus newly private or privatized, but sometimes small versus
large, and regional  versus national.  The difference was only described as foreign (including  joint
ventures) versus domestic banks in three countries.
Altogether 57 questionnaires for 31 countries were collected, that is, on average 1.8
questionnaire per country, with three respondents for most of the important countries.  All
respondents had extensive cross-country experience in the financial sector issues, which should
improve the quality  of their responses.  In the end, differences of opinion on particular questions
were actually few and judgments were seldom far apart (if anything, there was more disagreement
about facts than about  judgments).  Annex Table 2 lists the number of respondents and the
ratios of various  financial  assets  and liabilities  to GDP. This suggests  that at best  these indicators  could be used
across transition  economies.
121n the Czech  Republic,  for example,  conflicts  of interest may arise as banks indirectly-through the equity  stakes
of the investment  funds  they  control-have  a large influence  over  firms. while also  being creditors  of the same
firms.  Similar questions  have  arisen concerning  the cross-ownership  of banks, funds, and enterprises  in Russia.
13 Vice-versa,  if the distinction  was not made, it does not mean that there vere not good  or bad banks, but just that
the distribution  was  probably  less  wide.8
number of differences  of opinion per country. 1
4 While the judgments remain subjective-and  thus
reflect their particular experiences,' 5 and also may reflect what respondents want to see in a good
banking system, the close answers in case of more than one respondent provides some degree of
comfort.
How does institutional development look across countries?
Using the answers from this survey, a composite indicator for the quality of banks was
created.  In particular, the first principal component of the answers for 31 questions was derived,
using the best and worst segment in each country as independent observations.  The first principal
component explains  about 60% of the variations on all individual questions.  This indicator for the
quality of banks thus allows for a broad comparison of the progress in building the institutional
foundation for a financial  system. Figure three provides the scores for the quality of banks, best,
worst and average, where the countries are ranked according to the score for the quality of the
best segments, and the average is weighted according to the size of the worst and best segments.
The individual scores are reported in Annex Table 3.  Note that the first principal component is an
index with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.  As these underlying scores reflect
subjective  judgments, the first principal component and corresponding country rankings should of
course be considered accordingly.
Figure three makes clear that  the better  banks in transition economies differ greatly in
institutional capacity, among each other as well as compared to  other countries at similar income
level.  None of the transition economies have banking systems of the quality in countries such as
Denmark, Greece, and Spain.  The most advanced transition economies have better parts of their
banking system that  are comparable to  those  in  middle-income countries  such  as  Argentina,
Turkey  and  Venezuela.  Low  ranked  countries  are  Albania, Belarus,  Georgia,  Kyrgyz,  and
Uzbekistan.  Three of the four countries for which there was no (full) questionnaire, Mongolia,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan,  would probably also rank this low.  The fourth country, Azerbaijan,
would probably be marginally better than these three.  It is also clear from Figure three that the
4 In case of two responses,  differences  of opinion  meant that there was a difference  of more  than one category.  In
case of three responses,  differences  of opinion  were noted if all three answers  were  very  different  (for example, 1. 3
and 5).  If the answers  were  close,  for example, 1, 2 and 3, 2 was considered  to be right. Altogether,  there were
151  cases for 18 countries  where  opinions  differed. These 151  cases amounted  to 151/(18*58)  or 14%  of all
answers.
15 This may matter  particulary  for low-frequency  events such as banking crises. Depending  on whether one has
lived  through a banking  crisis  may greatly  influence  one's responses  to these questions. I would  like to thank Phil
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(Dworst segments of the banking system show much less variation across countries than the best
segments do;'6 the quality of many worst segments is simply very low.  This lack of development
of the worst segment in many transition economies also implies that, within countries, the spread
between worst and best segments can be very large.  Relatively, the worst segments are the
farthest behind the best segments in the new entny countries.  In CEE, there is generally  less
variation within countries; but notable excepticns are Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary that still have
relatively very weak segments of varying asset sizes (the size of the worst segment  in Bulgaria
85%, in Hungary 40%, and in Poland 40%).  The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia appear
to be the countries where the differentiation  between strong and weak bank segments  is the least.
Depending on the size of the best and worst segments, the average will be of course closer to the
best or worst.
Given the small differences in scores between some countries, it is more useful to use
broad classes instead of exact scores.  As the worst segment show much less variation across
countries, the classification  is done on the basis of the best segment.  The best (or the only)
segments of the banking system, and using all the indicators, can be classified in five classes as
follows (Table 1, the worst segments are generally ranked in the bottom three classes).
16 Excluding  nontransition  economies,  the standard  deviations  of the quality of the best  and worst  segments  are
0.51 and 0.33 respectively.I1
Table 1: Classification of Countries (Best Segments only)
Quality of best banks in the country  Country
5  No transition economy.  Comparator countries:
Denmark, Greece, and Spain.
4  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Poland,
Russia,  Slovenia.  Comparator  countries:
Turkey.
3  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Kazakstan,  Lithuania,
Moldova,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  and
Vietnam.  Comparator countries: Argentina and
Venezuela.
2  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  China,  Latvia,  FYR
Macedonia,  and Ukraine.
1  Albania,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kyrgyz  Republic,
Mongolia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  and
Uzbekistan.
Notes:  The  classification  is done  for  the  best  segment  and uses  a clustering  technique.  where  answers  to the same
questions  as to generate  the first principal component  were used. Four classes  were first distinguished.
Class 3 was then split  into two  classes  (3 and 4 ) on the basis of the share  of best  banks, with  countries
with a market  share (in terms of assets) of best banks equal to or larger  than 50% assigned  to the higher
class (4). Azerbaijan,  Tajikistan,  and Turkmenistan were assigned  using the classification  of the EBRD
(1995). Mongolia  was  assigned  on the basis of a recent World Bank internal  report. The classification
using the clustering  technique  differs  somewhat  from that one would  obtain  from  creating  classes  on the
basis of the first  principal  component  as a clustering technique creates  similar  groups  on the basis of all
available  data.
How does the banking environment differ across countries?
The difference  in quality in banks across transition economies may be attributable to
differences in the quality of the environment for banking, including regulation and supervision and
the general infrastructure. Figure four provides scores from the surveys for the quality of banking
regulation and supervision, and scores for the quality of the banking infrastructure (quality of
payment system, interbank market, accounting conventions, etc.) as well as the quality of the best
banks.'7 There is much less variation in the quality of banking regulation and supervision and
" The indicators for the quality  of banking regulation  and supervision,  and for the quality  of the banking
infrastructure  are the simple  averages  of answers  on 16 and 5 questions  respectivelh.  with  scores  from I through 5,
where 5 denotes  most or best.
i12
banking infrastructure than in the quality of banks.'1  Furthermore, there is only a very weak
positive association between the quality of the best banks and the other two measures, with that
for banking infrastructure somewhat stronger than that for banking regulation and supervision.
Only for Denmark, Greece, and Spain are the relationships strong and excluding these three
countries, the correlations drop then also significantly.  The correlations  between the indicator for
the quality of banks with that for the quality of banking regulation and supervision is 0.34 for the
best segment and 0.02 for the worst segment; for transition economies only, the correlations
between the quality of the best and the worst weak banks and the quality of the banking
infrastructure are 0.38 and 0.15 respectively.'9 The lower correlations for transition economies
alone could indicate  the quality of the banking environment has mattered less to the quality of
banks when compared to developed countries.  In addition, regulation and supervision seems to
have had less of an impact on the development of the banking system than banking infrastructure
has had.  This may reflect that good regulation and supervision take time to develop and the
period since the onset of transition has simply been too short.  Of course, there could also be (lack
of) causality the other way: a good banking system may lead to a better infrastructure, but less so
20 to good banking regulation and supervision.
18 To correct  for  the  fact  that  the  principal  components  have  a mean  of zero  whereas  these  indexes  do not,  we
calculated  the coefficients  of  variation  (standard  deviations  divided  by  the mean  index)  for  the  banking  regulation
and supervision  and  for  infrastructure  indexes,  0.18  and 0.21,  respectively,  which  can  be compared  with  the
standard deviations  of 0.51 for the first  principal component  for the best banks  and 0.33 for the worst  banks.
'9 With the three developed  countries,  the R2s for the best segment increase  to about  0.45 and 0.67 for the banking
regulation  and supervision  and infrastructure  indexes  respectively.
20 This is confirmed  in simple  regression  of the indicators for the quality  of the best  banks  on the two  policy
measures,  where  the qualitv  of banking  regulation  and supervision  is not significant  for either the best  or worst
banks and where the quality  of the banking infrastructure  is significant for both  segments.Figure 4: Quality of Banking Regulation and Supervision, Infrastructure and
the Quality of Best Banks
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Notes:  The average  score for 16  (legal environmenl,  i.e., banking regulation  and supervision)  and 5 (bankinig  infrastructure)  questionis;  and the average  score
for  31I  questions  on the quality  of best banks. Average  score  instead  of the firsl principal  comnponent  is plotted  lo allowz  for  a direct comlparisonl  with
the  scores  for the banking env'ironntent.  Countries  are ranked  by the quality  Of  best  banks. Dala arc also reported  in Annex  Table 3.3.  General Patterns and Lessons
General patterns anid  lessons  for  banking reform
Two broad observations emerge from how banking systems of transition economies-and
segments within countries-rank:  the rate of progress has varied and segmented banking sxstems
have evolved.  Rate of institutional progress can be faster under the ne'ii entrl'  approach than
under the rehabilitation approach.  This is clear as the better segments of some neill)  entry'
reformers (for example, Estonia, Russia, and Kazakstan) are now at par with rehabilitation
reformers (like Hungary and Poland) or other countries at similar income levels (see Figure 3 and
Table 1), even though their starting conditions were much worse.  Or put differently,  the high
ranking of many rehabilitation reformers reflects more their better starting conditions than their
progress since transition.  This suggests that, in terms of institution and skill building, an approach
with little (top-down initiated) reform of state banks and relatively liberal entry of new, private
banks can be useful for less-advanced countries.  Given their poor starting points, particularly,
NIS could benefit from this decentralized institution-building approach (and indeed several have
chosen so).  Choosing the new entry approach could also be preemptive, as future remonetization
would otherwise mainly  go to the existing banks, which often have poor lending records and
improve too slowly. Choosing the rehabilitation approach when faced with poor initial
conditions could be the worst approach as progress is too slow.  The lesson for more-advanced
countries would be to rely less on reforming state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and more
on entry of and competition by new, private banks.
Segmented banking systems have evolved in many countries with large differences
between the worse segments, often SOCBs, and good segments, often of new private and
privatized banks created through spontaneous breakups of SOCBs, or (foreign) joint venture
banks.  While the market share represented by the worst segment differs considerably across
countries, the worst segments vary little in quality.  The quality of better banks has only a weak
relationship with the quality of weak banks in both new entry and rehabilitation countries (the
correlation between the quality of the best and worst segments is only 39%).  In contrast to the
strong banks, the weak banks are thus not benefiting from new entry.  Either the development of
the worst segment is speeded up dramatically or the worst segment needs to explicitly segmented
from the rest of the banking system (and the clients of it from the rest of the enterprise sector) to
minimize negative spillovers.
As worst segments even exist in countries with relatively good banking supervision and
banking infrastructure (for example, Poland), better infrastructure alone may not have improved
the worst segments of the banking system (or for that matter contain the problems). Competition
may neither been effective because of government policies that provide preferences to the worst
segments (for example, tax relief) or that allow weak banks continued access to central bank
facilities or to deposits attracted by above-market interest rates (for example, through explicit or
implicit deposit insurance). The limited impact of competition may have been worsened by the
fact that many of the state banks each had their own special sectors (for example, agriculture,
housing); measures limiting  enterprise reform may then also have protected these banks.  A more
level playing field is thus called for, particularly with respect to specialized banks.  Eliminating15
direct government ownership is probably part of this.  The alternative, segmenting the worst
banks from the rest of the banking system, requires as a first step excluding these banks from
(preferential or normal) access to central bank facilities if they are in violation of prudential and
capital adequacy guidelines.
What are some specific lessons regarding government policies?
There are also relationships between specific government policies and the quality of banks
which can provide for some specific lessons. In particular, the scores on individual  questions on
the survey are used directly in regressions trying to explain the quality of banks, separately for the
worse and best segments, and including transition and non-transition economies.  Since there are
several questions on the survey covering similar policies issues, multicollinearity  is extensive
(multivariate regression results thus differ from univariate).  A stepwise procedure is therefore
used to identify the significant  questions for the worst and the best segments separately. The five
questions which are significant  (some, however, at lower t-statistics levels) for both the best and
the worst segments are then kept.  Table 2 provides the results for the group of transition
economies and comparator countries combined.
Table 2: Relationship of Specific Policies with Quality of Banks
Number of observations  30  Degrees of freedom  24
First  Principal  First  Principal  Component
Component  for  the  Best  for  the Worst  Segment
Segment
R2  0.67  R2  0.70
adj. R2 0.60  adj. R2  0.64
Variable  T- Stat  T-
Coefficient  Sign.  Coefficient  Stat  Sign.
Constant  -1.59  -3.65  0.00  -2.41  -5.77  0.00
Troubled  Bank Intervention  0.30  2.44  0.01  0.41  3.23  0.00
Recapitalizations  0.17  3.67  0.00  0.05  1.21  0.23
Policy  of  Entry of  New Banks  0.27  3.63  0.00  0.19  2.55  0.01
Activity  of the Interbank  Market  0.29  2.83  0.00  0.33  4.12  0.00
New State-Enterprise  Banks  -0.07  -1.33  0.18  -0.17  -2.99  0.00
Notes:  Dependent  variables  is the first principal  component  for the particular bank segment  derived  from the
answers to 31 questions;  the scores  of the independent  variables  are indexes 1  through 5. with  5 best or most, and
refer  respectively  to: the quality  of troubled  bank intervention  (in large banks), the intensity  (the number)  of bank
recapitalizations,  the de-facto  attitude  towards  of entry  of ne-w  (domestic)  banks (with the more  liberal  the higher
the score),  the activity  of the local currency  interbank  market. and the degree of new banks  established  by state
enterprises. The regressions  include  both  transition  economies  and non-transition  economies.  but exclude
Tajikistan as no full questionnaire  was available.  The t-statistics  correct  for heteroskedasticitv  using  White's
(1980)  procedure.
21 Since the independent  variables  are ordinal-and  to some extent the first principal components  suffer  from this
too as they are derived  from ordinal  measures,  OLS may  be biased. Calculating  Spearman  (rank)  correlations
leads  to similar results  for the best segment,  however.  as all five v  ariables have significant  rank  corrclations  (with
the same sign).  For the worst segment,  only  the quality  of troubled  bank intervention  and the intensity  of bank16
Four individual factors have a positive relationship with the quality of both the best and
worst banks: the quality of troubled bank intervention (in large banks), the intensity  of bank
recapitalizations, the attitude towards entry of new (domestic) banks, and the activity  of the
interbank market.  There is a negative relationship between the degree of new banks established
by state enterprises and the quality of banks (significant for the worst banks).
The fact that the quality of troubled bank intervention has an about equally positive
relationship with both the best and worst banks suggests that the main benefit of troubled bank
intervention is through signaling  a certain policy stance.  If actual direct intervention, presumably
mainly in weak banks, would have been the most important aspect of troubled bank intervention,
one would have expected that the relationship with troubled bank intervention would have been
less strong (or even absent) for the best segment and stronger for the worst segment. The fact
that the intensity of recapitalizations is positively related to the quality of the best banks (and very
weakly positive for the worst banks) can be for two reasons: one, ceteris paribus, formal
recapitalizations (and associated policy  measures) improve the quality of the banking system,
particularly of the best banks; and two, formal recapitalizations are more likely  to take place when
the overall banking system is better.  Since the relationships refer to the institutional  quality of
banks, the first explanation would in itself not be sufficient evidence to argue that bank
recapitalizations are a good use of fiscal resources (for example, DECVP (1995) argues strongly
that bank recapitalizations are most often not).  The second would confirm the notion that the
rehabilitation approach (which typically includes recapitalization) is more likely  when initial
conditions are better.
The regression results suggest that a liberal policy towards entry can raise the quality of
banks, both through competition and innovation. Entry through  state enterprises  establishing
banks has drawbacks, however, as relative more of these banks turn out to be poor, thus
negatively affecting banks quality, especially of the weak bank segment (and more marginally of
the better banks). The positive relationship  between the quality of the interbank market and the
quality of banks likely reflects demand (that is, better banks leading to better infrastructure) and
supply (that is, better infrastructure leading to better banks) forces.
These regressions refer to the five variables which are significant for both the best and
worst segments.  There are also some relationships which only hold for one segment.  In
particular, there is a significant  positive relationship between the quality of the best banks and the
quality of banking supervision. The causality is unclear, however.  Countries with better banks
may more likely have better banking supervision, regardless of the effect of supervision  on the
quality of banks, or better banking supervision may have a positive effect on the quality of banks.
The first is the most likely as the time period since banking supervision has been in place in most
transition economies is too short to expect a strong effect of it on the institutional  development of
banks.  For the worst segment, "the application of the central bank and banking acts which are
recapitalizations  have significant  rank correlations. A multivariate rank-on-rank  regression  leads  to the samc
results  for the best segment  (except  that the significance  for entry of new state-enterprise  banks  drops to 0.37 from
0.18).  For the worst segment,  the significance  of policv  of entrv new banks and the degree  of new  banks
established  by state enterprises  drops to 0.16 and 0.21 respectively.  The other three variables  remain  significant17
more conducive to an efficient and sound banking systems" has a negative relationship  with
quality.  Also, a more "competition in banking" attitude of the authorities has a negative
relationship with the quality of the worst segment.  One interpretation could be that a more
favorable attitude of the government towards banking and competition leads to more actual
competition which worsens the worst banks, instead of encouraging them to improve. As also
noted above, the degree of banks being privatized to state enterprises and of new private banks
being established also have negative relationships with the quality of the worst segment. As for
the result above on general entry, this may reflect that with more liberal privatization  and entry the
quality distribution widens and weak banks more likely arise.
There is also lack of certain relationships, which is also informative. There are no
significant, robust relationships  between the quality of both the best and worst banks and the
degree of state bank privatization. This may reflect the large variety in approaches to bank
privatization-for  example,  spontaneous break-ups followed by implicit privatization  as owners
are privatized, voucher privatizations, and formal recapitalizations followed by cash
privatizations-and  the associated wide range in outcomes.  The quality of payment and clearing
systems, and the quality of accounting standards are also not significantly  related to bank quality.
This may reflect that these institutions take a long time to develop-and  even a longer time before
they have an impact on the quality of banks-as  well as that they are in part demand-driven.
4.  Which  structural  factors and  initial conditions  matter?
The results for the quality of the banking systems are also related to some "structural"
conditions, such as those underlying  the data reported  in Annex Table 1, and the initial conditions
of the particular transition economy. For the latter, de Melo et al. (1996) develop two proxies for
transition economies. The first refers to the degree of initial distortions and the second to the
initial level of industrialization  (or development).22 The relationships between the "structural"
variables and initial conditions' proxies using univariate regressions are summarized  in Table 3
(results are for transition economies only).  The explanatory power (R2)  is generally  better for the
worst segments than for the best segment, but the significance of the structural variables and
proxies is higher for the best segment than for the worst segment.  This basically  reflects the lower
variability in the quality of the worst segment which increases the overall explanatory power-
through the intercept in the regressions-while  that of the structural variables is less.
22 The proxies are the first  two  principal  components  derived from 12 variables  as of 1989  or 1990  for CEE and
NIS, 1978  for China and 1986  for Vietnam,  which include trade dependencv,  repressed  inflation,  black  market
premium, length of time  under central  planning, resource endowment,  and per capita income.18
Table 3: Results from Univariate Regressions
Independent Variable  Best  Segment  Worst Segment
Employment (per 100,000)  +  t
Financial Depth (broad money as a share  + (12%)  +
of GDP)
Financial Depth (with China dummy)  +
Share of private sector in GDP, 1995  +  +(8%)
Currency  Share in Broad  Money  - (10%)
Market Share of Top Five Banks (assets)  - (16%)
Number of State Owned Banks  - (40%)
Number of Banks  +
Initial Level of Development  Proxy  +  + (6%)
Initial  Distortions  Proxy
Notes:  The underlying  data for  the regressions  are reported in Annex Tables I and 3, and in dc Melo et al (1996).
The figure in parentheses  indicates  the significance level when worse  than 5%:  all other coefficients  are
significant  at the 5% level  or better. Results are for 24 transition  economies  only.
The number of employees  in banking per  100,000 population has, as could be expected, a
positive  association  with  the quality  of the best and worst segments.  Financial  depth (at the end-
of-  1994) has a positive  relationship  with the quality of both best (significant  at 12%  only)  and
worst banks,  which  may  reflect  that many rehabilitation  reformers-which have higher  financial
depth and better starting  positions-still have better banks than many  new entry  reformers-
which have lower  financial  depth  and worse starting conditions. China  is an outlier,  however,  as
it has high financial  depth  and low  banking  skills.  a dummy  for it is then  also significantly  negative
in this regression  (and  in many  other regressions).
The share  of the private  sector in 1995 GDP has a positive  relationship  with the quality  of
the best and worst (significant  at 8% only) segments, confirming  the important  complementarity
between enterprise  and  banking  reform. 23 The higher the share  of domestic  cash in broad money
(M2, including  foreign  currency  deposits),  the lower the quality  of the best and worst (significant
at the 10% level)  banks. This  suggests  that households  act rationally:  they  will keep  their money
under the mattress  if the banking  system  is poor.
The concentration  of the banking  system (market share  of top five  banks)  has a negative
relationship  with the quality  of the best and worst (significant  at 16%  only)  segment,  confirming
again  the benefits  of rapid  new entry  for institution-building.  The quality  of the best segment  is
also negatively  related  to the number  of state-owned  banks. These  two relationships  together
23 Economic  growth  over  the 1990-1994  period does not have a significant  (linear)  relation  to banking quality.
Rank-correlations  betwveen  economic  growth  over  the 1990-1994  period and the quality  of best and worst bank are
somewhat  more significant  (at the 13%  and 1  1% level respectively,  with the weighted  average  qualitv  at 18%
level).19
suggests that an oligopolistic structure restrains institutional progress in both the best and worst
segment, possibly even more with state-ownership of banks.  This is further confirmed as the
quality of the best segment is positively related to the number of banks.  At the same time, the
quality of the worst segment is negatively related to the number of banks. These two
relationships may  just reflect that with more liberal entry the quality distribution widens and more
weaker as well as more stronger banks arise (which makes the respondents of the survey better
able to distinguish  weak from strong banks).  It may also indicate that more competition
stimulates the development  of strong banks, but has adverse affects on weak banks.  There is thus
strong evidence that in transition economies higher market concentration has inhibited
institutional progress. 4  There is also evidence, however, that an excessive liberal entry policy can
lead to many weak banks.
The proxy for the level of initial development is positively related to the quality of the best
and worst (significant  at only 6%) segments.  But, the explanatory power of the initial level of
development is very low, only 14% for the best segment and 8% for the worst segment.  The
proxy for the level of initial distortions is negatively related to both the best and worst segments
(here dummies for China are still significant as the level of distortions in China was relatively
low).  Here, the degree of explanatory power is reversed, 10% for the best segment and 18% for
the worst segment. The explanatory power of the regressions when including both proxies for
initial conditions is similar  for both segments, 28% for the best segment and 31% for the worst
segment.
Multivariate regressions which do not include initial conditions confirm that (signs of the
coefficients in parentheses) depth (+) and market share of top five banks (-) are jointly significant
for the best segment; and that depth (+), market share of top five banks (-), and number of banks
(-) are jointly significant  for the worst segment.  For the average quality, depth (+, at a 13%
significance-level),  market share of top five banks (-), and number of banks (-) are jointly
significant. When including the two initial conditions proxies (signs of the coefficients in
parentheses) the market share of the top five banks (-), the initial level of distortions (-) and the
initial level of development (+, at a 6%-level) are jointly significant for the best segment; and the
market share of top five banks (-), the number of banks (-), the intensity of recapitalizations (+),
the initial level of distortions (-) and the initial level of development (+, at an 1  1%-level) are
jointly significant  for the worst segment.  For the average quality, the market share of the top five
banks  (-) (or the number of banks (+)), the initial level of distortions (-) and the initial level of
development (+) are  jointly significant. The main difference when including the two initial
conditions is that financial  depth is not longer significant. This is because financial depth at the
24  Caprio  and Summers  (1995)  argue, when  banks are private and motivated  by profits,  that franchise  values-
maintained  through  restricting  competition-are important  for prudent  banking. Here  it is argued  that incrcased
competition  may  advance  institutional  progress  in private banks. There is not necessarily  a contradiction:  the
difference  lies in the peculiar  circumstances  of the transition economies  where  financial  institutions  were very
weak. The point made  here is that decentralized  institutional  building,  helped by liberal  entry, can be quicker than
top-down,  rehabilitation  institution  building.  Depending on how one  weighs stability  versus institution  building
in transition  economies,  the merits  of more  competition  Nsill  be of course  different. Gorton  and Wilton (1996)
argue that "some  instability  of banks  is socially  desirable in transition  economies"  as it helps brcak link between
lenders  and borrowers!20
end of 1994 depends to a significant extent on the initial levels of distortions, most importantly, of
course, the degree of repressed inflation.
As mentioned,  the explanatory power of the initial conditions is about 30%.25 The
relatively low explanatory power suggests that the current quality of the financial system reflects
only partly starting conditions, and to significant extent progress since then, particularly for the
best segment. When including both initial conditions the following countries have an average
quality of their banking system which is significantly  better (that is, these country dummies are
significantly  positive when including the two initial conditions proxies): Estonia, Russia,
Kazakstan, Slovenia,  Czech Republic, Viet Nam, Hungary, and Moldova, where the countries are
ranked from best to better relative to initial conditions. Countries with relative to initial
conditions worse banking systems are: Georgia, Albania, Slovakia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and
Belarus where the countries are ranked from worst to better relative to initial conditions.
It is interesting  to note that countries which pursued the new entry approach (Estonia,
Russia, and to some degree Kazakstan) as well as countries which pursued the rehabililation
approach (Hungary and Slovenia) have banking systems which are better relative to initial
conditions.  Several countries which did pursue rehabilitation approach, such as Bulgaria and
Poland, however, have systems which are not better relative to initial conditions.  This suggest
that progress under the new entry approach can be at least as rapid as under the rehabilitation
approach.  No financial  reform is clearly the worst approach as several of the countries with
banking systems  which are worse relative to initial conditions have had little reform of any kind
(for example, Belarus and Ukraine).  When correcting the quality of the best and worst segments
separately for initial conditions, there are about as many (9) countries that have best banks
significantly  better relative to initial conditions than there are countries that have significantly
worse best banks (10).  But, more (11) countries have weak banks which are worse relative to
initial conditions  than there are countries with weak banks which are better relative to initial
conditions (only 8).  This suggests that, relative to initial conditions, financial reforms (or the lack
thereof) have been the least successful in improving weak banks.
25 This explanatory  power  is arguably  still overstated  since  the two regressions  include intercepts,  which  provide
most of the explanatory  power,  especially  for the weak segment.21
5.  Conclusions
Progress in institutional capacity of banks tends to be faster under the newv  entry-with
more liberal entry-than  under the rehabilitation approach.  Choosing the rehabilitation
approach strategy when faced with a weak institutional legacy can thus be a poor policy as
progress is slow. Regardless of reform approach, weak banks have generally evolved little from
central planning, even in countries with a good banking infrastructure.  Excessive concentration,
preferential treatment by governments and limited entry appear to inhibit progress in these banks.
The main lessons are that banking reform approaches in transition economies should stress
decentralized institution-building  and penalizing weak banks.
Because of weak legal infrastructures, problems associated with highly leveraged financial
intermediaries-such  political interference, fraud and implicit guarantees-limited  institutional
development, much uncertainty and inside information, the role of banks will nevertheless still
remain limited in many transition economies.  Self-finance, intermediation among enterprises and
through non-bank financial  institutions are in the short run better solutions for many transition
economies.  These forms of  finance are closer to enterprises, have better information, are less
susceptible to political pressures, and have often less stringent demands on the legal infrastructure
than banks do.  They may also help improve the static and dynamic efficiency of the banking
system by providing competition and driving out weak financial institutions.z
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Number of  Number of  Share of assets of T  Recapitali-  Employ/  M23/GDP  Currcncy 4/
banks  SOCBs  top five banks t%)  zations'  10.0002|  (%)  M.2  ()
Albania  8  3  100  T  838  45  37
Armenia  37  5  85  n  22-  23  42
Azerbaijan  197  4  n  140  26  64
Belarus  52  7  75  n  323  11  25
Bulgaria  34  10  90  !  624  65  14
China  19  7  90  n  199  91  15
Croatia  47  19  70  !  854  21  24
Czech Republic  58  1  69  y  3136  74  1()
Estonia  16  1  70  !  1940  20  44
Georgia  203  5  90  n  219  3  56
Hungary  41  3  63  1746  43  26
Kazakstan  167  4  90  n  3]  11  58
Kyrg_z Republic  17  3  90  n  189  11  78
Latvia  40  3  55  y  2037  3(0  43
Lithuania  27  3  70  n  890  17  42
FYR Macedonia  40  3  97  571  25  22
Moldova  27  4  85  n  223  8  51
Poland  73  5  66  v  614  31  26
Romania  28  7  74  s  1349  1  5  30
Russia  2561  1  33  n  392  15  42
Slovak Rcpublic  30  2  79  v  2085  67  13
Slovenia  34  2  70  !  1678  37  10
Tajikistan  14  14  90  nl  112  425  58
Turkmenistan  2]  11  90 x  n  169  13'  47
|Ukraine  217  2  70  n  254  16  37
Uzbekistan  35  29  95  n  128  79  26
Viet Nam  62  4  90  y  N/A  22  58
Mongolia  14  1  90  n  158  23  31
Comparator
Countriess
United Kingdom  530  29  4140  90
France  419  43  3211  63  6
Spain  154  39  1536  82  13
Greece  35  63  1147  66  1  7
Denmark  124  77  4161  58  4
Turkey  68  45  790  32  10
Venezuela  41  2236  29  9
Argentina  166  40  360  1  22
Developed countries  192  50  2909  71  824
Notes:  Except where  noted,  the source  of the data is World Bank Staff estimates.  IMF.  EBRD.  central  bank
reports, and other  published  sources.  Number  of banks includes  the number  of SOCBs  (= State-Owned
Commercial  Banks,  defined  as banks where the state directly  holds more  than 50%  of equity).  Unless
noted otherwise,  data  refer to the situation  as of the middle  of 1995  and are estimates.
1.  Recapitalizations  refer  to formal recapitalization  programs; it excludes  ad-hoc  recapitalizations  (such as
the carving  out of a loan  for an enterprise  which is privatized).
2.  For all countries.  except  where  noted,  the number refers to employees  in the whole  financial  sector. not
just banking,  and the real  estate sector. For NIS, the source  is the CIS Statistical  Office  Database  and the
data are for 1994;  for other  countries  the source  is ILO (1995) and data are for 1993.
3.  Domestic  currencv  component  of broad money (M2) only. Data are averages  of quarterly  M2/GDP  ratios
to account  for the effects  of high inflation.
4.  Cash holdings  as a share of domestic  currenc) broad money  (M2). End-of-1994  data except  where noted.
5.  1993.
6.  1993.
7.  Only banking sector.
8.  For comparator  OECD  countries,  the data for the number of banks and market  shares  are for 1992 and the
source is OECD  (1993).Annex Table 2: Number  of Responses  and Differences of Opinion
Country  Number  of responses  Number  of Differences of
Opinion
Albania  3  10
Argentina  2  6
Armenia  2  4
Belarus  2  15
Bulgaria  I
China  3  8
Croatia  2  14
Czech Republic  I
Denmark  1
Estonia  2  14
Georgia  I
Greece  1
Hungary  3  6
Kazakstan  2  2
Kyrgyz Republic  .3  10
Latvia  I
Lithuania  I
FYR  Macedonia  I
Moldova  2  18
Poland  3  8
Romania  1  _  ___
Russia  2  8
Slovak Republic  3  9
Slovenia  2  4
Spain  1
Taj  ikistan2 `  1I
Turkey  I
Ukraine  3  6
Uzbekistan  3  6
Venezuela  1
Vietnam  2  3
Total:  31 Countries  57  151
Notes:  In case  of three questionnaires,  differences  of opinion were noted if all three  answers  were very  different
(for  example,  1, 3 and 5).  If the answers  were around the same  value,  then the average wvas  used (for
example,  if the scores  were 1, 2 and 3. then 2 w.as  used)
26 Only a partial response  was received  as no extensive  mission had yet taken place.Annex  Table  3: Individual  Countrv  Score
(Sorted by the score for the best  seament)
Country  Principal  Principal  Average  Average  Average  verage  Average
Component Compone Score  Score  for  Principal  Score  for  Score  for
of Best  t of Worst  or Best Worst  Componen  Legal  Infra-
Segment  Segment  t  structure
Georgia  -1.15  -1.15  1.49  1.49  -1.15  2.00  2.40
Albania  -0.99  -0.99  1.48  1.48  -0.99  1.75  1.60
Belarus  -0.82  -0.82  1.60  1.60  -0.82  2.06  2.80
Uzbekistan  -0.77  -0.95  1.68  1.51  -0.93  2.06  2.00
Kyrgyz Republic  -0.77  -0.77  1.63  1.63  -0.77  2.88  2.80
China  -0.68  -0.98  1.89  1.57  -0.95  1.94  1.80
Armenia  -0.50  -0.50  1.94  1.94  -0.50  2.93  2.00
Latvia  -0.45  -0.45  2.06  2.06  -0.45  2.94  3.00
FYR Macedonia  -0.36  -1.00  2.09  1.46  -0.62  2.81  2.60
Ukraine  -0.21  -1.02  2.20  1.57  -0.70  2.69  2.60
Vietnam  -0.19  -0.62  2.23  1.83  -0.57  2.43  1.80
Croatia  -0.13  -0.51  2.29  1.89  -0.32  2.31  2.80
Kazakstan  -0.04  -0.76  2.27  1.73  -0.51  [  3.25  2.80
Moldova  -0.03  -1.12  2.24  1.46  -0.58  2.56  2.20
Argentina  -0.00  -0.60  2.46  1.74  -0.30  2.81  2.80
Slovak Republic  0.05  -0.71  2.24  1.80  -0.48  2.19  2.40
Turkey  0.17  0.17  2.51  2.51  0.17  2.50  3.80
Lithuania  0.27  -0.98  2.60  1.68  -0.48  2.27  2.80
Slovenia  0.31  0.18  2.53  2.40  0.24  1.94  2.20
Czech Republic  0.33  0.05  2.66  2.41  0.25  2.63  3.40
Romania  0.34  -0.39  2.74  2.15  -0.25  2.29  2.20
Poland  0.34  -0.82  2.63  1.77  -0.12  2.88  3.20
Hungary  0.37  -0.46  2.66  1.97  0.04  2.31  2.40
Russia  0.42  -0.92  2.77  1.63  -0.12  2.81  2.80
Venezuela  0.43  -0.42  2.71  2.06  -0.16  2.50  2.40
Bulgaria  0.52  -0.81  2.57  1.52  -0.61  2.31  2.00
Estonia  0.54  -0.85  2.83  1.84  0.06  3.31  3.40
Denmark  0.88  0.88  3.21  3.21  0.88  3.67  4.20
Spain  1.77  1.77  3.91  3.91  1.77  3.14  4.60
Greece  2.35  2.35  4.00  4.00  2.35  3.23  3.80
Notes:  Results from principal components  analysis  and the average of the scores  on 31 questions  for the quality
of banks, and the average  of the scores  on the 16 questions  for lcgal (banking  supervision  and regulation)
and 5 infrastructure  questions.References
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